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IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
THE STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff/Appellee, 
v. 
TROY LABRUM, 
Defendant/Appellant. 
Case No. 930235-CA 
Priority No. 2 
STATUTES, RULES, AND CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS 
The fifth amendment to the United States Constitution 
provides: 
[Criminal actions - Provisions concerning - Due process 
of law and just compensation clauses.] 
No person shall be held to answer for a 
capital, or otherwise infamous crime, unless on a 
presentment or indictment of a Grand Jury, except in 
cases arising in the land or naval forces, or in the 
Militia, when in actual service in time of War or public 
danger; nor shall any person be subject for the same 
offense to be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb; nor 
shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness 
against himself, nor be deprived of life, liberty, or 
property, without due process of law; nor shall private 
property be taken for public use, without just 
compensation. 
Emphasis added. 
The fourteenth amendment to the United States 
Constitution, section 1 provides: 
Section 1. [Citizenship -- Due process of law -- Equal 
protection.] 
All persons born or naturalized in the United States, and 
subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United 
States and of the State wherein they reside. No State shall make 
or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities 
of citizens of the United States; nor shall any State deprive any 
person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; 
nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection 
of the laws. 
Emphasis added. 
Article I, section 7 of the Utah Constitution provides: 
Sec. 7. [Due process of law.] 
No person shall be deprived of life, liberty or 
property , without due process of law. 
Article I, section 12 of the Utah Constitution provides: 
Sec. 12. [Rights of accused persons.] 
In criminal prosecutions the accused shall have 
the right to appear and defend in person and by counsel, 
to demand the nature and cause of the accusation against 
him, to have a copy thereof, to testify in his own 
behalf, to be confronted by the witnesses against him, to 
have compulsory process to compel the attendance of 
witnesses in his own behalf, to have a speedy public 
trial by an impartial jury of the county or district in 
which the offense is alleged to have been committed, and 
the right to appeal in all cases. In no instance shall 
any accused person, before final judgment, be compelled 
to advance money or fees to secure the rights herein 
guaranteed. The accused shall not be compelled to 
testify against himself; a wife shall not be compelled to 
testify against her husband, nor a husband against his 
wife, nor shall any person be twice put in jeopardy for 
the same offense. 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-2-202 (1990) provides: 
76-2-202. Criminal responsibility for direct commission 
of offense or for conduct of another. 
Every person, acting with the mental state 
required for the commission of an offense who directly 
commits the offense, who solicits, requests, commands, 
encourages, or intentionally aids another person to 
engage in conduct which constitutes an offense shall be 
criminally liable as a party for such conduct. 
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Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-203 (1990) provides in pertinent 
part : 
76-3-203. Felony conviction -- Indeterminate term of 
imprisonment -- Increase of sentence if firearm 
used. 
A person who has been convicted of a felony may be 
sentenced to imprisonment for an indeterminate term as 
follows: 
(2) In the case of a felony of the second 
degree, for a term at not less than one year nor 
more than 15 years but if the trier of fact finds a 
firearm or a facsimile or the representation of a 
firearm was used in the commission or furtherance 
of the felony, the court shall additionally 
sentence the person convicted for a term of one 
year to run consecutively and not concurrently; and 
the court may additionally sentence the person 
convicted for an indeterminate term not to exceed 
five years to run consecutively and not 
concurrently; 
Emphasis added. 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-203.1 (Supp. 1993) provides in 
pertinent part: 
76-3-203.1. Offenses committed by three or more persons 
-- Enhanced penalties. 
(1) (a) A person who commits any offense listed in 
Subsection (3) in concert with two or more persons 
is subject to an enhanced penalty for the offense 
as provided below. 
(b) "In concert with two or more persons" as 
used in this section means the defendant and two or 
more other persons would be criminally liable for 
the offense as parties under Section 76-2-202. 
(3) The enhanced penalties for offenses committed 
under this section are: 
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(d) If the offense is a second degree felony, 
the convicted person shall be sentenced to an 
enhanced minimum term of six years in prison. 
(5) (a) This section does not create any separate 
offense but provides an enhanced penalty for the 
primary offense. 
(b) It is not a bar to imposing the enhanced 
penalties under this section that the persons with 
whom the actor is alleged to have acted in concert 
are not identified, apprehended, charged, or 
convicted, or that any of those persons are charged 
with or convicted of a different or lesser offense. 
(c) The sentencing judge rather than the jury 
shall decide whether to impose the enhanced penalty 
under this section. The imposition of the penalty 
is contingent upon a finding by the sentencing 
judge that this section is applicable. In 
conjunction with sentencing the court shall enter 
written findings of fact concerning the 
applicability of this section. 
Emphasis added. 
STATEMENT OF ADDITIONAL ISSUE AND STANDARD OF REVIEW 
5. If the firearm enhancement and the gang enhancement 
were properly applied, what is the effect of these enhancements on 
Mr. Labrum"s sentence? 
Standard of review -- correctness. Construction of a 
statute is a question of law reviewed for correctness. In re 
Estate of Anderson, 821 P.2d 1169, 1171 (Utah 1991); State v. 
Swapp, 808 P.2d 115, 120 (Utah App. 1991). 
STATEMENT OF ADDITIONAL FACTS 
Mr. Labrum had his original hearing before the Board of 
Pardons on December 1, 1993. The Board indicated that Mr. Labrum's 
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expiration date was 10/01/2018 for the charges involved in this 
case. A copy of the Board's decision is included in Addendum A. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I. MR. LABRUM'S MISSING TRANSCRIPT 
CLAIM IS NOT WAIVED, AND HE HAS 
ADEQUATELY SHOWN PREJUDICE. 
(Responding to appellee's brief at Point I, pp. 7-
14.) 
A. THE MISSING TRANSCRIPT CLAIM IS NOT 
WAIVED. 
The State asserts that the lack of any objection 
appearing on the record during the missing portion of the 
transcript establishes waiver. Because transcription did not 
occur, of course there are no objections appearing. This 
highlights the prejudice to Mr. Labrum --he can neither show any 
possible prejudicial remarks, nor show what meritorious objections 
his counsel might have made. 
The fact that the court reporter did transcribe one 
particular objection, does not preclude the possibility that other 
objections may have occurred. Even if no objections were made, Mr. 
Labrum is still entitled to assert plain error or manifest 
injustice on appeal. 
B. MR. LABRUM HAS ESTABLISHED PREJUDICE. 
State v. Gray, 601 P. 2d 918 (Utah 1979) , relied on by the 
State, predates State v. Taylor, 664 P.2d 439 (Utah 1983), and to 
the extent they are inconsistent Taylor thus controls. In Gray, 
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the defendant asserted that failure to transcribe closing arguments 
required reversal without any indication that anything 
inappropriate occurred. In contrast, here the court reporter 
herself affirmatively asserts that the trial court's charge to the 
jury went beyond the written jury instructions contained in the 
record. Mr. Labrum is thus unable to address on appeal whether the 
charge to the jury was prejudicial. While closing arguments always 
occur and seldom contain reversible error, the charge to the jury 
is a critical part of the trial. Both sides submit proposed 
instructions, and objections are argued to the court outside the 
presence of the jury. Part of the reason for written instructions 
is to enable effective review on appeal. This exercise loses much 
of its purpose and effectiveness when the trial court goes beyond 
the written instructions in charging the jury. 
POINT II. MR. LABRUM HAS ARGUED AND 
ESTABLISHED PLAIN ERROR WITH RESPECT TO 
THE PROSECUTOR'S IMPROPER VOUCHING FOR 
THE CREDIBILITY OF STATE WITNESSES. 
(Responding to appellee's brief at Point II, pp. 
14-18.) 
A. MR. LABRUM HAS ARGUED PLAIN ERROR. 
The State asserts that Mr. Labrum has "not argued that 
the comments constituted plain error, let alone included an 
analysis of or legal support for a plain error argument." 
Appellee's brief at 17. The Court is referred to Mr. Labrum's 
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opening brief at p. 5,1 and pp. 12-14. Mr. Labrum has properly 
cited the Court to legal authority, and his claim is plain: the 
prosecutor's vouching for his witnesses should have been obvious to 
the trial court, and affected the substantial rights of Mr. Labrum. 
Supreme Court precedent on this subject is clear: 
Also, in regard to prosecutorial vouching for 
witnesses, it has been stated: 
"Attempts to bolster a witness by vouching for his 
credibility are normally improper and error." The 
test for improper vouching is whether the jury 
could reasonably believe that the prosecutor was 
indicating a personal belief in the witness' 
credibility. This test may be satisfied in two 
ways. First, the prosecution may place the 
prestige of the government behind the witness, by 
making explicit personal assurances of the witness' 
credibility. Secondly, a prosecutor may implicitly 
vouch for the witness veracity by indicating that 
information not presented to the jury supports the 
testimony.21 
2 1 U n i t e d States v. Sims, 719 F.2d 375, 377-78 (11th 
Cir. 1983), cert, denied, 465 U.S. 1034 (1984) (citations 
omitted) (quoting United States v. Ellis, 547 F.2d 863, 
869 (5th Cir. 1977)), quoted in United States v. Dennis, 
786 F.2d 1029, 1046 (11th Cir. 1986); accord United 
States v. Roberts, 618 F.2d 530, 533-34 (9th Cir. 1980), 
quoted in State v. Salcido, 140 Ariz. 342, 344, 681 P.2d 
925, 927 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1984); cf. Schlatter v. 
McCarthy, 113 Utah 543, 557, 196 P.2d 968, 975 (1948) 
^ n the statement of issues presented, Mr. Labrum states: 
2. Whether the prosecutor's direct comments on witness 
credibility constitute misconduct requiring reversal? 
Standard of Review -- plain error. 
When objections are not made at trial and properly 
preserved, appellate review is under a "plain error" 
standard. Plain errors are those that "should have been 
obvious to the trial court and that affect the 
substantial rights of the accused." 
State v. Ellifritz, 835 P.2d 170, 174 (Utah App. 1992) (quoting 
State v. Morgan, 813 P.2d 1207, 1210-11 (Utah App. 1991). 
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(civil case stating general rule that a party who calls 
a witness thereby vouches for his or her veracity). 
State v. Carter, 776 P.2d 886, 893 (Utah 1989). 
Finally, the four pages of argument by the State, 
directly addressing this issue raised in Mr. Labrum's opening 
brief, belies the State's claim that this issue is not properly 
raised. This issue is before the Court and must be addressed on 
the merits, albeit under a plain error standard of review. 
POINT III. BY ITS PLAIN TERMS, THE FIREARM 
ENHANCEMENT REQUIRES A SPECIAL VERDICT OR 
SPECIFIC JURY FINDING ON FIREARM USE. 
(Responding to appellee's brief at Point III, 
pp. 19-22.) 
The State attempts to make it Mr. Labrum's burden to see 
that the State is successful in applying the firearm enhancement to 
him. To the contrary, the State has the burden of proving its 
case, including all the necessary factual predicates for any 
enhancements it seeks to impose. 
Because the State did not ask for a special interrogatory 
concerning firearm use, the State fails in its attempt to apply the 
enhancement to Mr. Labrum. The issue here does not concern jury 
instructions.2 The State waived its opportunity to request a 
special interrogatory. The sole issue here is whether the 
enhancement may be applied in the absence of the statutorily 
required predicate of a jury finding of use of a firearm. 
2Had the State requested a special interrogatory, it would 
certainly have been proper. 
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The State cites State v. Angus, 581 P.2d 992, 995 (Utah 
1978) for the proposition that no specific finding is required. In 
Angus, the information specified that the defendant was charged 
with assault with a firearm. The use of a firearm was a necessary 
element of the offense with which the defendant was charged, and 
the jury's guilty verdict by necessity included a finding that a 
firearm was used. Here, the information as read to the jury did 
not contain use of a firearm as an element. See R. 146-7 
("attempted to cause the death . . . or intending to cause serious 
bodily injury to another, committed an act clearly dangerous to 
human life") . See also R. 52 (jury instruction no. 1, likewise 
failing to mention use of a firearm). The guilty verdict returned 
by the jury here does not include as a necessary incident that a 
firearm was used. 
Application of the firearm enhancement here results in an 
illegal sentence, which may be corrected at any time. Utah Rule of 
Criminal Procedure 22 (e). The sentence imposed for the firearm 
enhancement should be vacated. 
POINT IV. MR. LABRUM HAS NOT WAIVED HIS 
OBJECTION TO THE TRIAL COURTS FAILURE TO 
ENTER WRITTEN FINDINGS ON THE GANG 
ENHANCEMENT. 
(Responding to appellee's brief at Point IV, 
pp. 22-30) 
The State correctly notes that no objection was made to 
the trial court's failure to enter written findings on the gang 
enhancement. However, after the sentence is imposed, the judgment 
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is final for purposes of review. The State is seeking to impose a 
requirement to file post-judgment motions for purposes of 
preserving sentencing issues. By the State's reasoning, abuse of 
sentencing discretion can never be raised absent a post-judgment 
motion objecting to the sentence imposed. This is not so. The 
court's failure to utilize the correct procedure in imposing the 
gang enhancement may properly be raised here. 
The purposes behind the preservation rule likewise compel 
this result. Objections are required to allow an opportunity to 
correct errors and remove any possible taint before the jury 
returns its verdict. With sentencing issues raised on appeal, no 
new trial is required. The results of the trial remain in place, 
resulting in no prejudice to the State. Vacation of the sentence 
here will only require that a new sentencing hearing be held. 
State v. Ramirez, 817 P.2d 774, 787-8 (Utah 1991), relied 
on by the State for the proposition that no written findings are 
required, is inapposite. Ramirez did not concern an issue where 
the governing statute specifically requires written findings. The 
State offers no support for its position that the plain language of 
the statute may be ignored. 
POINT V. THE STATE IS NOT ENTITLED TO SUPPLEMENTAL 
BRIEFING. 
(Responding to appellee's brief at Point V, 
pp. 30-33) 
In footnote 8 at page 33 of appellee's brief, the State 
requests the opportunity to provide supplemental briefing should 
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this Court decide to address the issue on the merits. The State 
has had its opportunity for briefing, and has waived all arguments 
it declined to proffer in its brief. Supplemental briefing is not 
warranted. 
POINT VI. MR. LABRUM HAS FULLY MARSHALLED THE 
EVIDENCE WITH RESPECT TO MR. BEHUNIN'S INTENT. 
(Responding to appellee's brief at Point VI, 
pp. 33-35) 
The State discusses a great deal of "evidence" gleaned 
from the pre-sentence investigation report concerning Mr. Behunin, 
but even if that evidence is properly before the court, it does not 
address Mr. Behunin's intent prior to or at the time of the 
incident in question. After the fact "approval" and "gloating" are 
simply irrelevant. The critical fact is that Mr. Behunin was out 
of earshot at the time the "plans" were made, R. 287, and there is 
nothing to indicate he was aware of what was to occur at the time 
of the incident. 
The State's attempt to reserve the right to supplemental 
briefing (appellee's brief at fn.10) has already been addressed 
under Point V, supra. 
POINT VII. IF THE ENHANCEMENTS WERE PROPERLY 
APPLIED, MR. LABRUM'S SENTENCE EXPIRES AT THE 
LATEST IN 2012. 
Mr. Labrum has been in custody since October, 1992. He 
was sentenced for a 2nd degree felony (1-15 years) , the gang 
enhancement (minimum term enhanced to six years, making it 6-15 
11 
years) , and the firearm enhancement (1-5 years3) , for a total 
sentence of 7-20 years. The Board's conclusion that the maximum 
term is 26 years is wrong, and should be corrected. 
CONCLUSION 
Mr. Labrum is entitled to a new trial due to omissions in 
the transcription of the trial during the reading of the jury 
instructions. Mr. Labrum is entitled to a new trial due to the 
prosecutor's misconduct in closing arguments. 
If this Court fails to find that Mr. Labrum is entitled 
to a new trial, then his sentence should be corrected. The jury 
made no finding that a firearm was used in the commission of this 
offense. Absent such a finding, the firearm enhancement must be 
vacated. The trial court made no written findings concerning 
application of the gang enhancement, so it must be vacated. The 
gang enhancement is unconstitutional, and should not be applied. 
The gang enhancement should not be applicable without a jury 
finding of applicability. Finally, the evidence in this case fails 
to support a finding that the gang enhancement is applicable. Mr. 
Labrum's sentence should be corrected accordingly. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 31st day of/ January, 1994. 
ROBERT K. HE^NEMAN 
Attorney for Defendant/Appellant 
3See State v. Willett, 694 P. 2d 601 (Utah 1984) (maximum 
additional sentence for a firearm enhancement is five years, even 
though it can plausibly be read to be six years). 
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CERTIFICATE OF DELIVERY 
I, Robert K. Heineman, hereby certify that I have caused 
eight copies of the foregoing to be delivered to the Utah Court of 
Appeals, 400 Midtown Plaza, 230 South 500 East, Salt Lake City, 
Utah 84102, and four copies to THOMAS BRUNKER, the Attorney 
General's Office, 236 State Capitol, Salt Lake City, Utah 84114, 
this 31st day of January, 1994. A i 
/Am-— 
Robert K. Heineman 
DELIVERED/MAILED this day of January, 1994. 
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ADDENDUM A 
Results of Board of Pardons Hearing 
BEFORE TtfE BOARD OF PARDONS OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
RATIONALE FOR DECISION ON D*e*( > $9*> FOR fty# y M / J 
Heariiig Date bearing Type 
Die Boai^ d of Pardons1 decision1 is 7)as& pn *the-*f ollowing* factb»s1 
VgGPAVATINg MITIGATING 
OFFENDER'S BACKGROUND 
Criminal history significantly underrepresented by guidelines 
• (i.e.f more than 4 felony convtetldns and/or 8 misdemeanors) 
. >> History qf similar offenses* iV *\%« -• -IS Pattern of increasingly or debreasringly serious offenses . . • . 
_ _ _ frflis-toor^of unsucces^ul or successful supervisions . X. ^ . >. ;.^  * 
S* CHARACTERISTICS Of JHE OFFENSE 
is Use of weapons or dangerous instrumentalities 
v^ ^Demonstration of extreme cruelty or depravity 
__r>- J Abuse ofr position of trust, special skill, or responsibility \S Multiple incidents and/or victim's * ~ 
Personal gain reaped JErom the offense . 
* . - \L - - - . 
—-- - r
 4 OFFENDER'S TRAITS DURING THE OFFENSE ' 
*- J1otiyer C*ntent*onaL, premeditafced*3£a.. impulsive, reactionary) • . 
' Role (organizert leader Yfi. fqldcfaer, minimal participant) J . * . 
Obstruction.of justice vs. ea&|y withdrawal or self-surrender . 
y .* VICTIM CHARACTERISTICS ^ 
\f Extent of injury (physical, emotional, financial, social) 
Relatively vulnerable victim vs. aggressive or provoking victim , 
^ rVictim Is^positign o£ authority over offender 
OFFENDER'S PRESENT CHARACTERISTIC^ 
Denial or minimization vs. complete acceptance of responsibility 
Repeated* numerous Y&. First incarceration or parole revocation 
Extent or remorse and apparent motivation to rehabilitate . • • 
Timeliness and extent or efforts to p^v restitution ...... . . . 
Prison programming (effort to enroll, nature of programming) • 
Prison disciplinary problems or other defiance or authority . . 
Employment possibilities (history, skills, current job, future) 
Extent of community fear, condemnation ,. . . .
 v - » -
Degree of meaningful support system . . . . . . . ~g*i . ^ %. .; .v - % ' 
>
 i4N&ture and stability of release plans .-.y . :• .*** • • • '• • • • 
..Unusual institutional^ vulnerAbllarty (due to age,;healthr other) 
Overall rehabilitative progress and promise . . • • • .~*: . . . - ' 
Lengthy history of alcohol/druf abuse vs. apparent rehabilitation 
Substantial continuous period in custody on other charges . . . 
Likely release to detainer %. . . . 
^r^A/T^*^ - ., . ~~-
^"^ ' 'Date"
 t £s" Board Member 
BEFORE THE BOARD OF PAftDONS OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
UTA:-J ST\T2 OBSCIS m. 71124 
Coiisiderat im^o^the" StltusTbriAzmt; *ZO*^: . . ^ ^ . ^ J£RIS0}1 #Q-*~-219SS 
?ne 3>ove-enc:tici nacrer e-ne oi for consideration before the rJt \h Stat^ ^oar-* 
of ?ardons on the l^ta day of December,^^93, for: 
After a review of the submitted information and good cause appearing, the Board 
jaakes the following decision and order: 
RESULTS. 
^lehearins set f or JOS/2000 ^Lth 
p3fcaolo%ical report/1) address anger, 
hostility, violancafferii diagnosis issues)* 
To oe scheduled oa seme calendar as 
Co-defendant David Mills, USP# 21941, 
Modifi2.itio;i of int«rla decision of 12/01/93 
to- take under advisenent and to correct 
expiration date* 
Mo Sriae Sent Ca^e ??o. Judge ^^.tratlon 
i ->M :ua.<:±L ;/?\<:C:D£ 25 '-2i5uIT5i "^ vT^ s iu/01/201..* 
2 AIT ASSAJL.; 1 321901836 !0£L i • 10/01/201'.) 
r:ii?. iecisioii is subject to review and Modification y^ the 3oari oc Par -ions at 
any tine until actual'release fron custody. 
3v order of tns Board of: ?arTon^ of the- State of iJtah, I have th*s date 
14 th day of ^eceniber, 1993, affixed ay signature as Chairman for and 
on behalf .>i: t.14 State of Uta.af Board of Pardons, 
!, R, Siobett, %airs*a 
